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Abstract
As a consequence of falling relative demand for low skilled labor in the OECD,
people with no or minor qualiﬁcation experience a deterioration of their economic sit-
uation. While ﬂexible labor markets have led to higher wage diﬀerentials in the USA,
the major problem of most European countries is the high rate of unemployment of
the low skilled.
To integrate currently discussed determinants of wage distribution and unem-
ployment into a common context, labor unions and qualiﬁcation diﬀerences in labor
supply are introduced to an OLG-model with heterogeneous agents. The model gen-
erates skill speciﬁc unemployment rates and a wage dispersion aﬀected by production
technology, wage setting procedure, and qualiﬁcation structure of labor supply. As an
application of the model, the relative importance of wage dispersion, unemployment,
and lifelong learning for economic growth and income distribution can be evaluated.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J31, J51, D91, O41, C86
1 Introduction
The reasons for the currently bad economic situation of people with no or minor qualiﬁca-
tion are of particular interest to all OECD countries. While this situation is mainly caused
by low paid work in the USA, the major problem in most European countries is the high
rate of unemployment of low skilled workers. Low pay and high unemployment are often
considered as consequences of a common cause, namely the falling relative demand for low
skilled labor because of new, skill intensive technologies and rising competition from low
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skill abundant countries. The diﬀerences are supposed to result from diﬀerent degrees of
wage ﬂexibility: While the ﬂexiblity of the US labor markets led to falling relative wages
of the low skilled, labor market organization and institutions in Western Europe prevented
suﬃcient wage adjustments and, thus, low skilled workers became unemployed. This rea-
soning leads to the opinion that lower unemployment in Europe will come at the cost of
higher inequality of incomes.
There is common consensus that labor unions play a signiﬁcant role for wage determination
and, therefore, for the unemployment history of Western Europe during the last 25 years,
see e. g. Nickell & Layard (1999). In particular, labor unions are held responsible for the
rigidity of wages at the lower end of the wage distribution and for the failure of wage
adjustments in the face of high unemployment rates of low skilled workers, see e. g. Blau &
Kahn (1996). On the other hand, it is argued that low wage inequality in some European
countries reﬂects the homogeneous distribution of skills in comparison to the US, see e. g.
Freeman & Schettkat (1999) and Nickell & Layard (1999). According to this opinion,
unemployment in Europe is a consequence of high wage costs in general and is no skill
speciﬁc problem.
Hence, to examine the relationship between labor market institutions, unemployment,
and wage distribution it seems natural to search for a theoretically founded and at the
same time tractable way to consider labor unions in a model with qualiﬁcation speciﬁc
labor market segments. Because the individual decision for education is made in view of
future earnings one would like to choose a dynamic context, additionally, for example like
Heckman, Lochner & Taber (1998) in their approach to explain the rising wage inequality
in the USA. This paper takes a ﬁrst step in this direction by introducing labor unions and
unemployment beneﬁts to an OLG-model with heterogeneous agents. Labor unions and
ﬁrms Nash bargain over wages of the low skilled, while the labor market segment for high
skilled workers is competitive.
Under certain, plausible assumptions the unemployment rate of the unskilled corresponds
to that of a standard static union model with Nash bargaining, i. e., it is determined by
the low skilled’s income share, the generosity of unemployment beneﬁt, and the bargaining
position of unions. The wage dispersion is determined by production technology, wage
setting procedure, and qualiﬁcation structure of labor supply. Therefore, the model allows
to discuss the signiﬁcance of labor market rigidity, skill biased technological progress,
and skill structure of labor supply for unemployment, wage, and income inequality in a
common context. Furthermore, it yields a microeconomic foundation of the treatment of
unemployment in a model that is commonly used as a starting point for studying income
inequality, see Quadrini & R´ıos-Rull (1997).
The paper proceeds as follows: Sect. 2 describes the model and contains a discussion of the
crucial assumptions. For a special case of the model, some simulation results concerning the
relative importance of wage dispersion, unemployment, and lifelong learning for economic
growth and income distribution are described in Sect. 3. It contains a short explanation
of the method used to simulate the model, too. Sect. 4 concludes.
2
2 The Model
2.1 Government
The government raises a proportional social security tax on wages with rate τ ∈ [0, 1] to
ﬁnance an unemployment beneﬁt and a pay-as-you-go pension system. The unemployed
receive a transfer of bu ∈ [0, 1] times the net wage they would earn in case of employment.
This amounts to the assumption that employment beneﬁts remains constant for one period
and that almost all unemployed agents ﬁnd a job in the next period. Retired workers
receive br ∈ [0, 1] times the mean net wage of their skill group for a pension. In particular,
pensions are independent of unemployment spells. The government’s budget is balanced,
i. e., the revenue of the social security tax equals the spending for unemployment beneﬁts
and pensions.
2.2 Households
In every period a mass of N¯h/D high skilled and N¯l/D low skilled individuals enter the
economy for D periods. The mass of households N¯ = N¯h + N¯l is normalized to one. In
the ﬁrst d periods of living an individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor services;
she retires for the last D − l periods. As is common to the human capital literature,
it is assumed that work eﬃciency depends on skill and experience; to approximate work
experience age is used (see e. g. Card (1999)). Absolute eﬃciency grows from one cohort
to the next with a rate z ≥ 1 but relative eﬃciency is independent of cohorts. In the
following, the work eﬃciency of a worker of skill j ∈ {h, l} and age q ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} in
period t is given by
zj,q(t) = zj,qz
t , zj,q > 0 .
Hence, work eﬃciency does not depend on unemployment spells.
Notation for gross wage of a skilled and an unskilled worker of age q in period t is Wh,q(t)
and Wl,q(t), respectively. For net wages in eﬃcient units small letters are used:
wj,q(t) = (1− τ)Wj,q(t)/zt .
The labor market for skilled workers is competitive, while a fraction uq(t) of unskilled work-
ers of age q is unemployed in period t. An unemployed worker of age q ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} re-
ceives a transfer ztbuwl,q(t). Pensioners of skill group j ∈ {h, l} are paid a fraction br of the
average income of skill j workers. Hence, pensions ztbrwj,q(t), wj,q(t) := 1/d
∑d−1
p=0 wj,p(t),
are independent of age q ∈ {d, . . . , D − 1} but dependent on skill j ∈ {l, h}. To simplify
notation, we denote
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s =


se, if an individual is employed,
su, if an individual is unemployed,
sr, if an individual is retired,
and set
b(s) =


1, if s = se,
bu, if s = s
u,
br, if s = s
r.
Therefore, the net income from employment, unemployment beneﬁt, and pensions is given
by ztb(s)wj,q(t).
In period t0 a household of age q0 chooses consumption z
tcq0 and assets z
t+1aq0+1 to max-
imize her discounted stream of future expected utility. Consumption utility u(ztcq) is of
CES-form:
u(c) = ln(c) , γ = 1 , or u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ , γ > 1 .
The discount factor is β˜ > 0. Therefore, the expected life time utility can be written as
D−1∑
q=q0
βq−q0Eq0,sq0 (u(cq)) , β = β˜z
1−γ .
The household observes her budget constraint, her current situation characterized by age q0
and state sq0 ∈ {se, su, sr}, and the evolution of future wages depending on the distribution
of unemployment spells. It is assumed that assets earn a return r(t). Households enter the
economy with zero assets, a0 = 0, and they are not allowed to borrow: aq ≥ 0. Hence, the
optimization problem of the individual in eﬃciency units reads (skipping time indices):
max
aq0+1
Eq0,sq0
(
D−1∑
q=q0
βq−q0u(cq)
)
s. t. cq = (1 + r)aq + b(sq)wj,q − aq+1 > 0 for q = q0, . . . , D − 1,
aq0 given, aq+1 ≥ 0 , aD = 0 .
(1)
If households foresee their individual employment path (s0, . . . , sd−1) or if they can insure
against employment risk, aggregate asset holdings can be calculated from a representa-
tive agent version of (1) skipping the expectations operator. Otherwise, the household’s
problem can be solved by approximation of its value function v. For this, a recursive
representation of (1), namely its Bellman equation is used:
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v(a, q, s, j) = max
a′ permitted
u((1 + r)a+ b(s)wj,q − za′) + βEq,s (v(a′, q + 1, s′, j)) . (2)
Here a′ is permitted, if it is non-negative and allows for a positive amount of consumption
(1+ r)a+ b(s)wj,q − za′. A short description of the approximation algorithm can be found
in Sect. 3.
2.3 Firms
In every period a mass one of ﬁrms produce a good Y with a Cobb-Douglas production
technology
Y (t) = (Z(t)N(t))αK(t)1−α , α ∈ (0, 1) ,
using capital K and eﬃcient labor ZN . Eﬃciency Z grows at a rate z ≥ 1 as already
indicated describing the household sector: Z(t) = zt. Labor services N(t) emerge as
a combination of low skilled labor, Nl,q(t), and high skilled labor, Nh,q(t), respectively,
supplied by workers of age q:
N(t) = (Nl(t))
αl (Nh(t))
αh with Nj(t) =
d−1∑
q=0
zj,qNj,q(t) , j = l, h ,
αl, αh ≥ 0 , αl + αh = 1 .
(3)
Goods markets are monopolistically competitive, i. e., ﬁrms face a demand function for
their good Y depending on its price P , a price index P¯ , and aggregate demand Y¯ (t):
(P (t)/P¯ (t))−εY¯ (t) , ε > 1 .
In this setting, the elasticity of demand for goods, ε, determines the degree of competitive-
ness of goods markets. Speciﬁcally, the higher κ = 1− 1/ε the more willing are consumers
to substitute for a good in face of a rising price of that good.
A ﬁrm issues equities to ﬁnance investments. Because equities of diﬀerent ﬁrms are perfect
substitutes each equity pays the same dividend rate r(t). The ﬁrm’s goal is to maximize
the value of issued equities. Hence, if rational speculative bubbles are ruled out, the ﬁrm
maximizes the discounted present value of future cash ﬂows. The cash ﬂow, denoted
as Π, is given by revenues PY less wage bill,
∑
Wj,q(t)Nj,q(t), and investment costs,
I(t) = K(t + 1) − (1 − δ)K(t), δ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the optimization problem of a ﬁrm
in period t0 reads
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max
(Nj,q(t0))j,q ,K(t0+1)
Et
( ∞∑
t=t0
Π(t)∏t
i=t0
(1 + r(i))
)
s. t.
Π(t) = P (t)Y (t)−
∑
j=l,h
d−1∑
q=0
Wj,q(t)Nj,q(t)−K(t+ 1) + (1− δ)K(t) , t ≥ t0 ,
r(t0) , (Wq,j(t0))q,j and K(t0) given.
There are two important assumptions concerning the optimization problem of the ﬁrm:
Firstly, today’s employment and investment decision do not inﬂuence future wages. Hence,
future wages can be considered as constant, i. e., they do not play a role for the ﬁrm’s
decision. Secondly, ﬁrms can foresee the future development of wages and dividend rates.
Thus, for the derivation of next period’s capital stock, the expectations operator can be
skipped. Under these assumptions the decision rule of the ﬁrm for employment is given by
Wj,q(t) =
∂P (t)Y (t)
∂Nj,q(j)
= zj,qαjακ
P (t)Y (t)
Nj(t)
, κ = 1− 1/ε , (4)
and for investments by
r(t+ 1) + δ = (1− α)κP (t+ 1)Y (t+ 1)
K(t+ 1)
. (5)
Observing (4) and the deﬁnition of Nj(t) in (3), the proﬁt of a ﬁrm can be written as
P (t)Y (t)−
∑
j=l,h
d−1∑
q=0
Wj,q(t)Nj,q(t) = (1− ακ)P (t)Y (t) . (6)
2.4 Wage Setting and Unemployment
There are diﬀerent labor market segments for high and low skill workers, respectively:
Wages of high skilled workers are determined at competitive labor markets and, thus,
ensure full employment of this group. Wages of low skilled workers are the outcome of
Nash bargaining at ﬁrm level between the management and a labor union representing
all low skilled employees of the ﬁrm. Hence, a fraction uq of low skilled workers of age
q is unemployed. It is assumed that bargaining for period t0 takes place at the end of
period t0 − 1 after ﬁrms have determined capital inputs and employment of high skilled
workers in t0. Firms and labor unions do not bargain over employment, i. e., the ﬁrm has
a right-to-manage. Because there is no commitment regarding future periods t > t0 both
parties aim to maximize utility of period t0.
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More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts (6) obeying the decision rule for employment (4).
Up to a positive constant, proﬁts are given by Nακ. Unions maximize the average income
of a member, i. e., the weighted sum of earnings in case of employment at the ﬁrm, Wl,q,
and Vq = (1−uq)E(Wl,q)+uqbuE(Wl,q), otherwise; here, E(Wl,q) is the expected wage of a
union member who ﬁnds a job outside the ﬁrm. If union members of age q ∈ {0, . . . , d−1}
have mass N¯l,q the objective function of the union can, thus, be written as
d−1∑
q=0
Wl,q
Nl,q
N¯l,q
− Vq N¯l,q −Nl,q
N¯l,q
.
Therefore, the Nash maximand reads
(
d−1∑
q=0
Nl,q(Wl,q − Vq)
)ν
Nακ(1−ν) , ν ∈ (0, 1) . (7)
If we assume an inner solution, wages are set as a markup on alternative incomes (see the
appendix for details):
Wl,q =
(
ν
1
αlακ
+ 1− ν
)
Vq . (8)
Unemployment of low skilled workers can be calculated for a symmetric equilibrium from
(8) observing Vq = (1− uq(1− b))Wl,q:
u = uq =
1− αlακ
(1− b) (1 + αlακ1−νν ) . (9)
Hence, if unions do not favor a special group of workers and if bargaining parties do not
take into account future consequences of their decisions, the unemployment rate among low
skilled workers is independent of age and matches that of a static standard union model,
see e. g. Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991).
Following from the employment decision of ﬁrms (4) relative wages within groups are
determined by relative work eﬃciency:1
wj,p
wj,q
=
Wj,p
Wj,q
=
zj,p
zj,q
.
Relative wages between groups depend upon unemployment rates, relative labor supply,
and income shares, additionally:
1All cohorts have the same mass N¯j/D of members.
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wl,p
wh,q
=
Wl,p
Wh,q
=
zl,p
zh,q
· αl
αh
· N¯h
(1− u)N¯l .
The latter equations show that unions can achieve higher relative wages for their members
only at the cost of higher unemployment among low skilled workers. At the same time, the
model disentangles the inﬂuence of market institutions and skill structure of labor supply
on wage inequality: Given unemployment, a less heterogeneous labor force, i. e., a lower dis-
persion of the zj,q, allows for a more homogeneous wage distribution. Hence, besides labor
market rigidity, the model incorporates a second crucial determinant of wage dispersion,
that is made responsible for diﬀerences of wage inequality across OECD countries.
Furthermore, wage structure is inﬂuenced by production technology through relative in-
come shares αl/αh and relative work eﬃciency zl,p/zh,q. Thus, skill biased technological
progress modeled as an increase in relative income share αh/αl or a higher productivity
zh,p/zl,q of highly skilled workers, respectively, yields higher wage inequality. On the other
hand, this eﬀect is mitigated, if relative endowment N¯h/N¯l increases as a consequence of a
higher wage premium of skilled workers.
2.5 Merits and Drawbacks
Several features of the model establish its usefulness to study the relationship between labor
market institutions, unemployment, and wage distribution. Firstly, low skilled workers
face a higher employment risk than high skilled workers, as can be observed in all OECD
countries. Diﬀerent unemployment rates are induced by diﬀerenct wage setting processes
for the two skill groups: As is commonly assumed in empirical studies on the impact of
labor market institutions, labor unions bargain over the wages of lower wage groups only,
see e. g. Fitzenberger (1999). Secondly, the model encompasses several aspects discussed in
the context of the diﬀerent unemployment and wage distribution developments in Europe
and the USA: Unions can maintain a given wage distribution in the face of skill biased
technological progress (zl,pαl/(zh,qαh) falls) only at the cost of higher unemployment of
lower wage workers. This idea is expressed in the ‘two-sides-of-the-same-coin’ view of
unemployment in Europe and high wage dispersion in the USA (Krugman (1994)). On the
other hand, the degree of wage inequality is determined by the skill structure of the work
force, too. For example, pointed out by Freeman & Schettkat (1999) or Nickell & Layard
(1999), qualiﬁcation is considerably more homogeneous in Germany than in the USA and,
therefore, the distributions of wages in eﬃciency units in both countries are more similar
than wage distributions by education group. Thus, low wage inequality in Germany may
just like high wage gaps in the USA reﬂect an eﬃcient market outcome.
Somewhat unsatisfactory is the static view of the wage bargaining process. It hinges on
two crucial assumptions: Firstly, there are no adjustment costs in the model, as for ex-
ample introduced in models of search unemployment, see e. g. Pissarides (2000). Secondly,
bargaining parties do not consider the consequences of wage agreements for the future
development of the ﬁrm. Therefore, the objective function of ﬁrms and labor unions, re-
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spectively, is inﬂuenced by current wage and employment only. While the ﬁrst assumption
is made to simplify things, the second is reasonable for a bargaining structure as in Ger-
many. There, the bargaining takes place between an employer federation and a union
representing the workers of a whole sector. Because employment and investment decisions
are made at the ﬁrm level it is not possible for the employer federation to credibly make any
agreements concerning future employment and investment.2 Besides plausibility for certain
bargaining settings, the static view of wage setting is in accordance with empirical evidence
on the relationship between the determinants of economic growth and unemployment, see
Nickell & Layard (1999).
3 Some Implications of the Model
In this section, the results of some simulation exercises are described. The simulations
are conﬁned to the steady state and the case of one skill group. Therefore, we set αl = 1
and N¯ = N¯l = 1, i. e., we consider the case of experience dependent work eﬃciency and a
homogeneous unemployment rate for all experience groups. In the following, the index l for
wages and employment is skipped. To simplify notation, the price index P¯ is normalized
to one.
3.1 Steady State
In steady state the dividend rate is constant: r(t) = r∗. Employment of workers of age q
is (1− u)/D, where u is determined by model parameters (see (9)) and 1/D is the mass of
age q workers. Therefore, the model behaves at aggregate level like a standard neoclassical
growth model with labor input
N = (1− u)Z¯/D , Z¯ =
d−1∑
q=0
zq ,
and exogenous growth rate of labor augmenting technological progress z. Accordingly,
capital, labor, and transfer income, as well as capital input and production grow at rate z.
The dividend rate r∗ determines the capital stock in eﬃcient units of labor input, k =
K/(ZN), through (5):
k∗ =
(
(1− α)κ
r∗ + δ
) 1
α
. (10)
Observing (6) and K(t + 1) − (1 − δ)K(t) = (z − 1 + δ)K(t), steady state cash ﬂows
π = Π/(ZN) can be calculated as:
2Fitzenberger (1999) quotes that argument as justiﬁcation for assuming a right-to-manage of the ﬁrm.
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π∗ = (1− ακ)(k∗)1−α − (z − 1 + δ)k∗ . (11)
This in turn leads to an equation for the value of issued assets, i. e., for the discounted
present value of future cash ﬂows as = A/(ZN), as a function of r∗ and model parameters:
A(t) =
Π(t) + A(t+ 1)
1 + r∗
A(t+1)=zA(t)
=⇒ as(r∗) = π
∗
1 + r∗ − z .
Furthermore, from (10) and (4) net wages in eﬃciency units, wq = (1−τ)Wq/(ZN), follow
as:
w∗q = (1− τ)ακ(k∗)1−α
z¯q
(1− u)/D , z¯q =
zq
Z¯
. (12)
The size of the social security tax rate can be determined from the government’s budget
constraint:
τ
(1− u)
D
d−1∑
q=0
w∗q︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
= (1− τ)
(
bu
u
D
d−1∑
q=0
w∗q + br
D − d
D
1
d
d−1∑
q=0
w∗q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expenses
=⇒ τ = buu+ br
D−d
d
1− u+ buu+ br D−dd
.
Given net wages and dividend rate, households steady state asset holdings can be calculated
from the Bellman equation (2). It leads to a recursive deﬁnition of the value function v:
v(a,D, sr) constant and
v(a, q, s) = max
a′ permitted
u((1 + r∗)a+ b(s)w∗q − za′) + βEq,s (v(a′, q + 1, s′)) ,
(q, s) ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} × {se, su} ∪ {d, . . . , D − 1} × {sr} .
(13)
A variety of algorithms is in use to approximate the value function and with that the
decision rules in heterogenous agent economies, see e. g. Heer & Trede (2000) or R´ıos-Rull
(1995). The proceeding chosen here is to approximate the value function at a grid deﬁned
on the state space. A straightforward method would be to calculate the values of v at all
grid points starting at period D and to search for the maximum by comparing the values
of the function on the right hand side of (13) in every step D− 1, . . . , 0. This needs O(n2)
evaluations of the value function, where n is the number of grid points. But simplicity comes
at the cost of long running time. Therefore, two simple, time saving reﬁnements are made:
Firstly, binary search for calculating the maximum needs only O(n log2(n)) evaluations of
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the value function instead of O(n2). Secondly, a recursion starting at the time period of
the agents decision is implemented. This approach is suggested by the Bellman equation
and can be applied generally as a substitute of dynamic programming. Using a recursive
procedure for implementation implies that the value function must be calculated only if
the optimization algorithm calls for it. Therefore, the number of evaluations is determined
ﬂexibly at runtime and, in general, much less evaluations are required.
After the decision rules for a given dividend rate r are calculated, the asset holdings ad(r)
per eﬃciency unit of labor, ZN , can be determined. To ﬁnd the steady state dividend rate
r∗ a standard algorithm is used to solve the equation
0 = ad(r∗)− as(r∗) . (14)
3.2 Simulation Results
This section gives an impression of the impact of lifelong learning on economic performance.
Furthermore, it describes the results of a model simulation for homogeneous work eﬃciency
and a time proﬁle of eﬃciency calibrated to match the age-earnings proﬁle of West German
males, respectively.
Tab. 1 shows the parameters values used to simulate the model. Most of them are chosen
to match German time series data. Exemptions are β, γ, and br. The discount rate β
was calibrated from the model using a steady state dividend rate of 4.5 percent3 in case
of homogeneous agents and u = 0. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ = 2 was
chosen to ﬁt into the range of microeconometric estimations of that parameter.4 Finally,
br is rather low for German data
5 but there would be an unrealistically strong impact for
redistribution caused by the simplistic assumption concerning pension claims, otherwise.
ﬁrms households government
α αl κ δ z d D β γ N¯l bu br
0.78 1 0.83 0.04 1.012 40 58 0.98 2 1 0.6 0.3
Table 1: Parameter values for model simulation. Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1999,
Tab. 3.11, 3.31, and 6.4, Maußner (1999), Linnemann (1999).
There is a simple way to demonstrate the impact of lifelong learning within the model: As
can be seen from (14) the dividend rate r∗ is independent of Z. Therefore, production,
capital, and wage levels are proportional to Z. More training on the job and better
adoption of new working skills can be modeled through a steeper path of work eﬃciency zq
3See Heer (2000).
4See Browning, Hansen & Heckman (1999).
5See the statistics of Verband deutscher Rentenversicherungstra¨ger at http://www.vdr.de/statistik.
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during working life q = 0, . . . , d− 1. For example, we can compare a path of no learning,
zq = z
−qz0, to a path implying homogeneous labor, zq = z0. Relative eﬃciency and, with
that, relative production, capital, and wage levels can be calculated as
dz0∑d−1
q=0 z
−qz0
= 1.25 .
This points to the fact that there is a strong impact of lifelong learning on the performance
of an economy.
The model is simulated for six settings: Besides the parameter values given in Tab. 1,
regarding the distribution of wages we distinguished between the case of homogeneous labor
(z0 = . . . = zd−1), documented in column ‘homogeneous labor’, and an age-earnings proﬁle
calibrated to match that of West German males,6 documented in column ‘heterogeneous
labor’. This leads to the wage dispersion shown in column ‘heterogeneous labor’ and row
‘wages’ of Tab. 2. Here, the row ‘gini’ gives the gini index; the notation Px indicates
the x percent quantile relative to the 50 percent quantile of a distribution. Furthermore,
for unemployment rates a reference value of u = 0 and values u ∈ {0.05, 0.1} are chosen.
These are lower and upper bounds for unemployment rates in Germany between 1981-2000,
with an average of 0.7 in this period.7 For the simulation Z¯ is set to 1. The table shows
the simulated dividend rates r∗ and the impact of unemployment on the relative level of
production Y/Y0. The simulated income distributions are given in row ‘incomes’.
empirical homogeneous labor heterogeneous labor
u 0.7 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.0 0.05 0.1
r∗ 0.0657 0.0660 0.0662 0.0772 0.0765 0.0765
Y/Y0 1 0.949 0.899 0.971 0.924 0.876
gini 0.09 0.00 0.09
wages P10 0.64 1.00 0.67
P90 1.62 1.00 1.07
gini 0.27 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.22
incomes P10 0.57 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.59 0.60
P90 1.72 1.39 1.40 1.41 1.67 1.68 1.70
Table 2: Simulation results.
In models of the kind presented here, the impact of uninsurable risks at macro level are
modest. This is shown by the results presented in Tab. 2 where the dividend rate r∗ is nearly
6The calibration makes use of the estimation of the age-earnings proﬁle of Lauer & Steiner (2000).
They estimate the equation ln(w) = β0 + β1s+ β2e+ β3e2, were w are hourly wages, s years of schooling
and e experience calculated as age minus 6.
7Including ex-GDR from 1991. Source: Eurostat.
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independent of the size of unemployment. As a consequence, relative production, capital,
and wage levels of two economies with diﬀerent work eﬃciency and diﬀerent unemployment
rates can be approximated by relative levels of eﬃcient labor input ZN .
Even though precautionary savings are insigniﬁcant at macro level, there is a value of using
heterogeneous agent models with uninsurable risk, if one is interested in wage, income, or
wealth distributions of economies with many diﬀerent agents. This is due to the fact that
the Bellman equation (13) is the same for every agent, given (q, s). Therefore, we have
to distinguish only a maximum of q · s household types instead of one for every possible
work history, i. e., 2d−1 types. Thus, if we want to consider the impact of unemployment
as well as skill diﬀerences for income distributions there are much more household types
than could be handled with a procedure based on a homogeneous agent model as proposed
by Caselli & Ventura (2000), for example.
To give an impression of the suitability of the model to address questions of wage inequality,
unemployment, and income inequality Tab. 2 shows the simulated income distribution for
the two cases ‘homogeneous labor’ and‘heterogeneous labor’, respectively. Unemployment
has only a minor impact. This result is probably due to the fact that unemployment spells
are rather equally distributed and it allows for a good approximation of the heterogeneous
agent model by a representative agent economy. But it do not conform to empirical re-
search, see e. g. Hauser & Becker (2000). While unemployment does not explain much of
the inequality in incomes, the empirical distribution of incomes is reproduced consider-
ably better if one allows for age-dependent labor earnings. This is a common property of
models of the kind presented here that is documented in Quadrini & R´ıos-Rull (1997), for
example.
4 Conclusion
A model integrating skill biased technological progress, labor market rigidity, and skill
speciﬁc labor market segments has been developed. Skill speciﬁc unemployment rates
depend on the wage setting process of the relevant labor market segment. Wage dispersion
is determined by production technology, wage setting procedure, and skill structure of
labor supply. Besides the additional structure arising from the microeconomic foundation
of wage setting, a similar version of the model is already in use, see e. g. I˙mrohorogˇlu,
I˙mrohorogˇlu & Joines (1995). It has shown to be a highly ﬂexible tool to analyze the
determinants of income distribution and welfare eﬀects of policy reforms.
But, tractability comes at the price of strong assumptions concerning the wage setting
process: It is assumed that bargaining parties do not take into account the impact of
their agreement for future developments of wages, employment and investments. Hence,
unemployment rates are determined by bargaining power, unemployment beneﬁts, and
the income share of union members–analogously to a standard static union model. This
simpliﬁcation is justiﬁed if bargaining takes place at sector level. In this case, bargain-
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ing parties cannot reach an agreement concerning employment and investment decisions,
because these are made at the ﬁrm level.
While the myopic bargaining perspective can be justiﬁed, there are other simpliﬁcations
which call for an extension of the model. Especially, to take into consideration the un-
equal distribution of unemployment spells within groups should lead to a higher impact
of unemployment on income inequality. Furthermore, for a discussion of policy options to
reduce unemployment in Europe without raising income inequality to US levels, the impli-
cations for the individual education decision become important. Thus, the model should
be augmented in the way proposed by Heckman et al. (1998), for example.
To conclude, the model accounts for diﬀerent reasons discussed in the context of widening
wage gaps and high unemployment rates of unskilled workers in the OECD. It shows a
theoretically founded and at the same time tractable way to study diﬀerent proposals to
improve the currently bad economic situation of the unskilled. For a meaningful analysis
of the impact of economic and education policy the model should be augmented in the
proposed directions.
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A Wage Setting
In this appendix it is shown how to derive (8) and (9). The Nash maximand of the bargain
between ﬁrm and labor union is given by (see (7))
(
d−1∑
q=0
Nl,q(Wl,q − Vq)
)ν
Nακ(1−ν) , ν ∈ (0, 1) .
It is positiv for its maximum value. Hence, using the employment decision of the ﬁrm (4),
additionally, it can be written, equivalently, as
Ω = ν˜ log (αuακPY − Φ) + logN , ν˜ = ν
ακ(1− ν) , Φ :=
d−1∑
q=0
Nl,qVq .
Therefore, the optimization problem reads
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max
(Nl,0,...,Nl,d−1)
Ω s. t. Nl,q ≤ N¯l,q
D
for q = 0, . . . , d− 1 .
It is straightforward to show that the Kuhn-Tucker theorem can be applied for maximiza-
tion. Therefore, an inner solution of the problem solves
∂Ω
∂Nl,q
= 0 for q = 0, . . . , d− 1 . (15)
To simplify the calculation we make use of the following equalities (see (4)):
∂PY
∂Nl,q
= Wl,q and
∂N
∂Nl,q
= zl,qαu
N
Nl,q
=
Wl,qN
ακPY
. (16)
Observing (16) we get from (15):
0 = ν˜
αuακ
∂PY
∂Nl,q
− Vq
αuακPY − Φ +
∂N
∂Nq
N
= ν˜
αuακWl,q − Vq
αuακPY − Φ +
Wl,q
ακPY
=⇒ ν˜Vq =
(
ν˜αuακ+ αu − Φ
ακPY
)
Wl,q =
(
αu
1− ν −
Φ
ακPY
)
Wl,q
=⇒ Wl,q = ν
ακ(1− ν)
1
αu
1−ν − ΦακPY︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:µ
Vq
In particular, µ = Wl,q/Vq is independent of q. Therefore, Φ reduces to
Φ =
d−1∑
q=0
Nl,qVq =
1
µ
d−1∑
q=0
Nl,qWl,q =
αuακPY
µ
.
This leads to
µ =
ν
ακ(1− ν)
1
αu
1−ν − αuµ
=⇒ µ = ν
αuακ
+ 1− ν
as stated in (8).
In a symmetric equilibrium we have Vq = (1−(1−b)uq)Wl,q = (1−(1−b)uq)µVq. Therefore,
(9) follows:
1 = (1− (1− b)uq)µ =⇒ uq = 1− αlακ
(1− b) (1 + αlακ1−νν ) .
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